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Abstract
In recent years, different subtypes of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)  
viruses caused outbreaks in several poultry types worldwide. Early detection of HPAI 
virus infection is crucial to reduce virus spread. Previously, the use of a mortality 
ratio threshold to expedite notification of suspicion in layer farms was proposed. The 
purpose of this study was to describe the clinical signs reported in the early stages 
of HPAI H5N8 and H5N6 outbreaks on chicken and Pekin duck farms between 2014 
and 2018 in the Netherlands and compare them with the onset of an increased mor-
tality ratio (MR). Data on daily mortality and clinical signs from nine egg-producing 
chicken farms and seven Pekin duck farms infected with HPAI H5N8 (2014 and 2016) 
and H5N6 (2017–2018) in the Netherlands were analysed. In 12 out of 15 outbreaks 
for which a MR was available, MR increase preceded or coincided with the first ob-
servation of clinical signs by the farmer. In one chicken and two Pekin duck out-
breaks, clinical signs were observed prior to MR increase. On all farms, veterinarians 
observed clinical signs of general disease. Nervous or locomotor signs were reported 
in all Pekin duck outbreaks, but only in two chicken outbreaks. Other clinical signs 
were observed less frequently in both chickens and Pekin ducks. Compared to vet-
erinarians, farmers observed and reported clinical signs, especially respiratory and 
gastrointestinal signs, less frequently. This case series suggests that a MR with a set 
threshold could be an objective parameter to detect HPAI infection on chicken and 
Pekin duck farms at an early stage. Observation of clinical signs may provide ad-
ditional indication for farmers and veterinarians for notifying a clinical suspicion of 
HPAI infection. Further assessment and validation of a MR threshold in Pekin ducks 
are important as it could serve as an important tool in HPAI surveillance programs.
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1  | INTRODUC TION
In recent years, different subtypes of highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza A (HPAI) viruses have caused outbreaks in different poultry 
types worldwide (Lee, Bertran, Kwon, & Swayne, 2017; Napp, Majó, 
Sánchez-Gónzalez, & Vergara-Alert, 2018).
Clearly, early detection of HPAI virus infection on poultry farms 
is essential to reduce risks for virus spread and minimize the so-
cio-economic impact of the disease (Backer, van Roermund, Fischer, 
van Asseldonk, & Bergevoet, 2015; Elbers, Fabri, et al., 2004), which 
is also increasingly reflected in legislation and contingency plans 
worldwide. European Union legislation on the control of HPAI (EU, 
2005a, 2005b) stipulates that early detection systems, aimed at a 
rapid reporting of any sign of avian influenza in poultry and other 
captive birds by owners or keepers to the competent veterinary au-
thority, need to be in place. For both LPAI and HPAI outbreaks, sud-
den changes in mortality have shown to be an indicator of infection 
(Elbers, Holtslag, Bouma, & Koch, 2007; Gonzales & Elbers, 2018; 
Malladi, Weaver, Clouse, Bjork, & Trampel, 2011), as well as clinical 
signs (Elbers, Kamps, & Koch, 2004; Elbers, Koch, & Bouma, 2005; 
Velkers et al., 2006).
These indicators have been used to formulate criteria in European 
Union legislation for reporting suspicion of a notifiable disease such 
as avian influenza in poultry, with even more detailed criteria imple-
mented in national regulations in the Netherlands (Box 1). However, 
the current reporting thresholds may not be sensitive enough for 
timely detection of HPAI virus infections (Gonzales & Elbers, 2018). 
Published reports on analyses of mortality data from previous 
outbreaks, that is HPAI H7N7 in 2003 (Bos et al., 2007; Stegeman 
et al., 2004) and HPAI H5N8 in 2014 and 2016 (Velkers, Elbers, 
Bouwstra, & Stegeman, 2015) have shown that (a) it takes several 
days after the start of increased mortality due to HPAI virus infec-
tions to reach the official reporting threshold of 0.5% mortality for 
two consecutive days; and (b) many flocks have already been depop-
ulated well before reaching these thresholds. To improve sensitivity 
of detection of LPAI and HPAI virus infections and at the same time 
maintain a high level of specificity, Gonzales and Elbers (2018) de-
veloped new reporting thresholds based on increased mortality and 
drops in egg production for layer farms, and evaluated the perfor-
mance of those indicators with HPAI H7N7 outbreak data from 110 
infected layer flocks in the Netherlands in 2003. The mortality ratio 
(MR), with a reporting threshold of 2.9 times higher mortality than 
the average weekly mortality of the previous week for that particular 
flock, had a 95.3% sensitivity to signal HPAI virus infection in laying 
hens and would have resulted in 2 days earlier detection compared 
with the current Dutch national thresholds for HPAI and in 7 days 
earlier detection for LPAI virus infection (Gonzales & Elbers, 2018).
For early detection of HPAI virus infections, the suggested 
MR ratio threshold of 2.9 may also be applicable to other poultry 
types. Ssematimba et al. (2019) recently explored efficacy of mor-
tality-based triggers for HPAI virus detection in game birds, but for 
commercial ducks and turkeys, which are also commonly affected 
during HPAI outbreaks, mortality thresholds have not yet been 
evaluated. Furthermore, as clinical signs have proven to be indica-
tors of HPAI virus infections, taking both MR and clinical signs into 
account may potentially further enhance early detection in different 
poultry types.
Therefore, the aim of this study was to describe the clini-
cal signs reported in the early stages of HPAI H5N8 and H5N6 
Box 1 European legislation and Dutch regulations 
on reporting criteria for avian influenza detection
European Commission Decision 2005/734/EC (EU, 2005a):
Article 2 stipulates that Member States shall introduce 
early detection systems, aimed at a rapid reporting of any 
sign of avian influenza in poultry and other captive birds 
by the owners or keepers to the competent veterinary 
authority.
Annex II: criteria to be considered when applying the 
measure set out in Article 2: drop in feed and water intake 
higher than 20%; drop in egg production higher than 5% 
for more than two days; mortality rate higher than 3% in a 
week; and any clinical sign or post-mortem lesion suggest-
ing avian influenza.
Dutch Ministerial Regulation TRCJZ/2005/1411 concerning 
the prevention, control and monitoring of infectious animal 
diseases, zoonoses and transmissible spongiform encepha-
lopathies (TSEs), Article 84 (Dutch State Journal, 2005):
Poultry keepers have to report increased mortality in lay-
ers, reproduction birds or broilers (older than 10 days) to 
the authorities in case of 0.5% mortality or more per flock 
per day for two consecutive days; in turkeys in case of 1% 
mortality or more per day for two consecutive days; and 
in AI susceptible birds in case of 3% or more mortality per 
week.
Poultry keepers of AI susceptible birds need to consult 
their veterinarian in case of a clinical problem; reduction 
in feed intake or water intake of 5% or more per day for 
two consecutive days; in layers and breeders a reduction 
in egg production of 5% or more per day for two consecu-
tive days.
Approved veterinary programme of the Netherlands under 
EU Regulation 652/2014 (EC, 2019; Elbers, Gorgievski-
Duijvesteijn, Zarafshani, & Koch, 2010):
Additionally, to ensure timely detection and minimize 
spread of infections with low pathogenic avian influenza 
(LPAI) viruses, that can mutate to HPAI viruses, an inten-
sive monitoring program that includes all commercial poul-
try holdings in The Netherlands is in place. Because LPAI 
virus infections can be asymptomatic or might generate 
only mild symptoms, veterinarians in the Netherlands can 
submit cloacal or pharyngeal swabs to exclude LPAI virus 
infection as a possible cause for clinical problems.
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outbreaks on chicken and Pekin duck farms between 2014 and 
2018 in the Netherlands and compare them with the onset of an 
increased MR. For this purpose, we collected data on mortality, 
production characteristics and clinical signs from 16 HPAI (H5N8 
and H5N6) outbreaks on poultry farms between 2014 and 2018 
in the Netherlands. We calculated the MR and daily mortality for 
each outbreak and provide an extensive inventory of the spe-
cies-specific clinical signs and how these developed over time in 
the days before official notification, as observed by poultry farm-
ers and veterinarians.
2  | METHODS
2.1 | Data collection
A case series study was performed on a total of 16 poultry farms 
that were diagnosed with HPAI infection caused by viruses of sub-
types H5N8 or H5N6 in the Netherlands between 2014 and 2018, 
which included six farms with laying hens, three farms with broiler 
breeders and seven farms with Pekin ducks (Table 1). The only other 
HPAI H5N8 outbreak in this period (World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE), 2017) not included in the analysis, was a wild water 
bird trading farm, that also housed domestic poultry in 2016. The 
day of notification (Table 1; Figure 1) refers to the day when the 
farmer or the veterinary practitioner reported a suspicion of avian 
influenza to the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety 
Authority (NVWA). Only for outbreak D-1, samples were submit-
ted to the national reference laboratory by the veterinary practi-
tioner in the Dutch national diagnostic framework of excluding LPAI 
(as described in Box 1; EC, 2019). In this outbreak, we considered 
the day of the positive result of these swabs as day of notification. 
In all outbreaks, a team consisting of a (state) veterinarian of the 
NVWA, a poultry veterinarian from GD Animal Health, and in most 
outbreaks the veterinary practitioner, visited the farms within 9 hr 
after notification for clinical inspection and official sample collec-
tion (referred to as veterinary inspection visit [VIV]). Inquiries on 
the history of the clinical situation observed by the farmer and clini-
cal signs observed by the veterinarians during this inspection were 
recorded in a standardized form (see Section 2.3). Twenty cloacal 
and pharyngeal swabs were collected per flock. Swabs were tested 
at the national reference laboratory by PCR for antigen detection 
TA B L E  1   Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus-infected commercial chicken and duck farms in the Netherlands between 2014 
and 2018 included in the study: notification and culling dates, flock data and HPAI virus subtype
Outbreak no.a 
Date of 
notification
Date of 
culling Poultry type
Flock 
size
Affected houses/
total houses
Flock age at 
notification
HPAI virus 
typeb 
L-1 14-Nov-14 16-Nov-14 Laying hens 124,000 1/6 55 weeks H5N8
L-2 19-Nov-14 21-Nov-14 Laying hens 41,400 1/3 67 weeks H5N8
BB-1 20-Nov-14 21-Nov-14 Broiler breeders 11,000 1/2 61 weeks H5N8
D-1e  21-Nov-14c  22-Nov-14 Pekin ducks 14,500 1/2 18 days H5N8
L-3f  29-Nov-14 30-Nov-14 Laying hens 28,000 1/1 22 weeks H5N8
D-2 25-Nov-16 26-Nov-16 Pekin ducks 10,000 1/1 40 days H5N8
D-3 30-Nov-16 1-Dec-16 Pekin ducks 8,500 1/1 24 days H5N8
D-4g  1-Dec-16 2-Dec-16 Pekin ducks 15,400 2/2 15 and 43 daysd  H5N8
L-4 12-Dec-16 14-Dec-16 Laying hens 63,000 1/3 38 weeks H5N8
D-5e  16-Dec-16 17-Dec-16 Pekin ducks 14,000 1/2 23 days H5N8
L-5 17-Dec-16 19-Dec-16 Laying hens 28,500 1/2 25 weeks H5N8
BB-2 19-Dec-16 20-Dec-16 Broiler breeders 48,000 1/4 30 weeks H5N8
L-6f  24-Dec-16 25-Dec-16 Laying hens 28,000 1/1 52 weeks H5N8
D-6g  7-Dec-17 8-Dec-17 Pekin ducks 16,000 1/2 29 days H5N6
BB-3 24-Feb-18 26-Feb-18 Broiler breeders 39,100 1/3 31 weeks H5N6
D-7e  12-Mar-18 13-Mar-18 Pekin ducks 29,700 1/2 32 days H5N6
aOutbreaks on Laying hen (L), Broiler Breeder (BB) and Duck (D) farms. 
bDiagnosis of HPAI, tested positive on real-time PCR on the matrix gene, H5-PCR and sequencing of the haemagglutinin and neuraminidase (Beerens 
et al., 2018). 
cSamples were submitted to the national reference laboratory by the veterinary practitioner in the framework of the Dutch early-warning system, we 
considered the day of the positive result of these samples as day of notification. 
dTwo flocks infected with HPAI virus present on the farm, one flock age 15 days the other age 43 days. 
eD-1, D-5 and D-7 are outbreaks of HPAI on the same duck farm. 
fL-3 and L-6 are outbreaks of HPAI on the same laying hen farm. 
gD-4 and D-6 are outbreaks of HPAI on the same duck farm. 
4  |     SCHREUDER Et al.
(Beerens et al., 2018). According to the protocol of HPAI virus-
positive farms, NVWA performed an epidemiological investigation 
to trace dangerous contacts prior to culling. This included a stand-
ardized interview with the farmer and collection of charts with at 
least daily records of mortality and production data, for example 
feed and water intake, and egg production. All birds on the HPAI 
virus-positive farms were culled within 1–2 days after the day of 
notification (Table 1).
Additionally, an in-depth epidemiological investigation was 
performed by specialized poultry veterinarians of the Faculty of 
Veterinary Medicine of Utrecht University. This investigation was 
performed for all farms between 9 days to 3 months after culling 
and was aimed to facilitate retrospective identification of the most 
likely moment and route of HPAI virus introduction and/or spread 
(referred to as Detailed Epidemiological Investigation [DEI]). For all 
farms, all available data collected by NVWA and laboratory results 
F I G U R E  1   Clinical signs observed by the farmers, categorized by organ system, for the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus-infected 
chicken (left) and duck farms (right) and exceedance of daily mortality (>0.5%) and mortality ratio (MR) thresholds in the 5 day period prior 
to notification. †Day of notification for D-1 was the day a positive result was found in the early warning swabs sent in by the veterinary 
practitioner. ‡Not enough mortality data were available to calculate the mortality ratio
 
Mortality ratio > 2.9
Daily mortality > 0.5 %
General
Gastrointestinal tract
Mucosal membranes and skin
Nervous or locomotor
Reproduction tract
Respiratory tract
Case no. 5 4 3 2 1 0
D -6
D - 7
Days prior to notification
D - 1†
D - 2‡
D - 3
D - 4
D - 5
Duck
Case no. 5 4 3 2 1 0
L - 1
L - 4
L - 5 
BB - 2
L - 6
BB - 3
Chicken
Days prior to notification
L - 2
BB - 1
L - 3
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were evaluated, additional in-depth interviews with farmers and 
farm employees, veterinarians from NVWA, GD Animal Health and 
the farms' veterinary practitioner were conducted retrospectively, 
and detailed production records were gathered. The farmers and 
veterinarians were inquired in detail about the course of infection 
and observed clinical and post-mortem signs in the 2 weeks prior to 
notification up to and including the day of the VIV. These data were 
used for further data analyses as described below.
2.2 | Mortality and production parameters
Mortality ratio (MR) and egg production ratio (EPR) were calculated as 
described by Gonzales and Elbers (2018) for each of the flocks, using 
available flock records of at least 5 days to approximately 1 month 
before notification. The threshold of 2.9 for MR, as applied for lay-
ing hens by Gonzales and Elbers (2018), was used and the first day 
the MR exceeded the threshold was considered as an increase in MR 
and used for further analyses. We were not able to calculate the MR 
for one Pekin duck farm (D-2) due to incomplete mortality data in the 
weeks prior to the outbreak. The current applied daily mortality (DM) 
threshold of 0.5% per flock (see Box 1) was also used for comparisons. 
In layer farms, an EPR of below 0.94 was considered as presence of 
reproduction tract signs. The use of this threshold alone, and in com-
bination with the MR, was validated as a way to detect LPAI and HPAI 
outbreaks at an early stage by Gonzales and Elbers (2018). Data on 
daily growth were not recorded in any of the affected farms. In farms 
where records of water and feed intake were available, a decrease in 
feed or water intake of 5% compared with the previous day was classi-
fied under general clinical signs as described below.
2.3 | Clinical signs
The standardized form used to record clinical signs observed during 
the VIV included a yes or no checklist with questions on feed and water 
intake, sudden death, ruffled feathers, diarrhoea, egg quality, oedema 
and cyanosis, nervous signs, abnormal conjunctivae, lacrimation, res-
piratory distress and decreased activity. Furthermore, the veterinar-
ians recorded findings on mortality, production and feed and water 
intake based on the flock records if available at time of VIV. At the DEI, 
poultry veterinarians of GD Animal Health and the farms' veterinary 
practitioners were questioned in more detail on the clinical signs on 
day of notification. In two outbreaks, the veterinary practitioner had 
visited the farm prior to notification, that is for outbreak D-1 2 days 
and for BB-3 1 day prior to notification. The observed clinical signs 
did not differ from the clinical signs observed at day of the VIV (data 
not shown). The farmers were queried at the DEI on the clinical signs 
observed in the period between 14 days prior to and the day of culling, 
but only the data until day of notification were used for the analyses. 
Also, the flock records were checked for notes on clinical signs.
A list of clinical signs, categorized in different categories, was used 
to compile all the data from the veterinarians from VIV and DEI, and 
only from de DEI for the farmers separately. The observed clinical signs 
were categorized in six categories, that is as clinical signs attributed to 
nervous and locomotor system; mucosal membranes and skin; respira-
tory tract; gastrointestinal tract; and reproduction tract (Tables S1–S4) 
or as general clinical signs. The latter category included signs of general 
illness, which could not be related to a specific organ system or were 
associated with signs of systemic disease, for example depression, 
reduced feed or water intake, ruffled feathers or hunched posture, 
cold or warm extremities and sudden death (Tables S1–S4). Signs of 
the nervous and locomotor system were categorized together as these 
were difficult to distinguish based on the information from the farmers. 
Mucosal membranes and skin signs included discolorations or oedema, 
most likely because of the endothelial damage caused by the virus, for 
example cyanosis, oedema and haemorrhages, including those in the 
conjunctivae. Excessive lacrimation and conjunctivitis without haem-
orrhages were categorized under (upper) respiratory signs. Decreased 
egg production (EPR < 0.94) and abnormal eggs were classified as 
signs of the reproduction tract. These data were used to report the 
frequency of detection of clinical signs for each of the six categories 
in Pekin duck and chicken farms (layers and broiler breeders) and for 
veterinarians and farmers separately.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Outbreaks
Five, eight and three farms were infected in the autumn-winter pe-
riod of 2014, 2016 and 2017–2018, respectively. No outbreaks oc-
curred in 2015. In 2014 and 2016 six farms with laying hens, two 
broiler breeder farms and five Pekin duck farms were infected with 
HPAI virus H5N8. In the winter of 2017–2018, two Pekin duck farms 
and a broiler breeder farm tested positive for HPAI virus H5N6. 
Some farms were affected repeatedly. This was the case for Pekin 
duck farms D-1, D-5 and D-7, for D-4 and D-6 and for laying hen 
flocks L3 and L6. On 13 farms, more than one poultry house was 
present, but only in one duck farm (D-4) two houses tested HPAI 
virus positive. The age of infected Pekin ducks varied between 15 
and 43 days and chicken flocks were between 22 and 67 weeks of 
age at notification.
3.2 | Clinical signs
A detailed list of the observed clinical signs by farmers and veterinar-
ians in the chicken and duck flocks based on VIV and DEI is provided 
in Tables S1–S4.
3.2.1 | Chicken farms
Figure 1 summarizes the clinical signs that were observed by farm-
ers in their flocks in the 5 day period prior to notification to the 
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authorities, and occurrences where the current official DM thresh-
old for reporting (>0.5%) or the MR threshold (>2.9) were exceeded. 
In both parameters, the first day the parameter exceeded its thresh-
old was used in the further analyses.
For the chicken farms, the first signs observed by the farmers 
were those of general disease in outbreak L-3 at 3 days prior to noti-
fication. On the day of notification, the farmers of the chicken farms 
(n = 9 outbreaks) observed general clinical signs in all nine outbreaks, 
clinical signs of the reproduction tract in six outbreaks, clinical signs 
of mucosal membranes and skin in three outbreaks, clinical signs of 
the gastrointestinal tract in three outbreaks, and clinical signs of the 
respiratory tract in two outbreaks. MR exceeded the threshold in all 
nine outbreaks, but only in six outbreaks the DM exceeded 0.5% per 
day on day of notification.
The frequency of observed clinical signs on the chicken farms 
(n = 9 outbreaks), as reported by the farmers (at day of notification) 
or veterinarians (during the VIV) for the six different categories 
is summarized in the left part of Figure 2. Similar to the farmers, 
the veterinarians reported general clinical signs in all nine chicken 
outbreaks. The frequency of the clinical signs reported by the vet-
erinarians was higher for signs of the gastrointestinal tract (seven 
outbreaks), mucosal membranes and skin (five outbreaks), and 
respiratory tract (five outbreaks), but lower for reproduction tract 
(four outbreaks) compared with the farmers. None of the farmers re-
ported nervous or locomotor signs, whereas veterinarians reported 
this in two outbreaks.
3.2.2 | Pekin duck farms
In the Pekin duck farms (n = 7 outbreaks), the first clinical signs 
were observed 2 days prior to the notification in two outbreaks 
(D-1 and D-5), which included general clinical signs and signs of 
the nervous or locomotor system and respiratory tract (Figure 1). 
For outbreak D-5, temporary sneezing was only observed at day 
two before notification. A day prior to notification farmers ob-
served clinical signs of the nervous or locomotor system in three, 
and of the respiratory tract in one of the outbreaks. On the day 
of notification, general clinical signs were observed in all seven 
outbreaks, signs of the nervous or locomotor system in six, gas-
trointestinal signs in two and respiratory tract signs in one of the 
outbreaks. The DM exceeded the 0.5% threshold in only four out-
breaks whereas the MR exceeded the threshold of 2.9 in six out-
breaks at day of notification. For D–2, the DM was only available 
F I G U R E  2   Overview of the frequency of detection of clinical signs, as categorized by organ system, observed on day of notification by 
farmers (in red) and veterinarians (in blue) on the day of veterinary inspection on highly pathogenic avian influenza virus-infected chicken 
(n = 9, left) and duck farms (n = 7, right)
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from 1 day prior to notification and therefore the MR could not 
be calculated.
The frequency of observed clinical signs on the seven duck 
farms, as reported by the farmers (at day of notification) or veter-
inarians (during the VIV) for the six different categories are sum-
marized in the right part of Figure 2. Overall, the frequency of 
clinical signs reported by the veterinarians was higher compared 
with the frequency of the clinical signs reported by the farmer. 
Similar to the farmers, the most prominent signs reported by the 
veterinarians were general clinical signs. Clinical signs of the ner-
vous or locomotor system were observed in all seven Pekin duck 
outbreaks, and clinical signs of the respiratory tract and the gas-
trointestinal tract were observed in five outbreaks. In contrast 
with the veterinarians, farmers only reported respiratory signs in 
one outbreak. Unlike the clinical signs observed on chicken farms, 
no signs of the membranes and skin were observed in the duck 
flocks by farmers nor veterinarians.
3.3 | Mortality
3.3.1 | Chicken farms
For chicken flock L-1, the MR exceeded the threshold 5 days prior 
to the day of notification, whereas in all others outbreaks the MR 
exceeded the threshold three or fewer days prior to notification 
(Figure 1). On the day of notification, the MR of all chicken farms 
exceeded the threshold. The DM exceeded the 0.5% threshold in 
two farms 1 day prior to notification and in six farms at day of noti-
fication. The MR exceeded 2.9 for only a single day on eight occa-
sions on six different farms in the 30 days period prior to notification 
(Figure 3).
In five out of nine outbreaks, the MR exceeded the proposed 
threshold prior to observing of clinical signs by the farmer, in three 
out of nine outbreaks the increase of the MR and first observation 
of clinical sign coincided, and in one outbreak the clinical signs were 
observed prior to an increased MR (Figure 1).
3.3.2 | Pekin duck farms
The MR exceeded the threshold the first time 5 days prior to day of 
notification in one house of one Pekin duck farm (D-4.1; Figure 1). At 
the day of notification, the MR exceeded the threshold in all six out-
breaks for which a MR was available. The DM exceeded 0.5% in four 
of seven outbreaks on day of notification and only in one outbreak 
(D-3) mortality exceeded 0.5% 1 day prior to notification (Figure 1). 
The MR exceeded 2.9 for only a single day on seven occasions on 
four different farms in the 30 days period prior to the notification 
(Figure 3). On six occasions the MR exceeded the threshold for a 
F I G U R E  3   (a) Calculated mortality ratio's in the 30 day period prior to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) notification for the nine 
chicken farms (top), of which three broiler breeder (BB) and six layer (L) farms, and six Pekin duck farms (D; bottom). The mortality ratio (MR) 
threshold of 2.9 is shown in red. In one outbreak on a duck farm, 2 houses were affected: D-4.1 and D-4.2. (b) A more detailed plot of the 
calculated mortality ratio's in the 30 day period prior to HPAI notification in chicken and Pekin duck outbreaks. Cut-off on the Y-axis was set 
to 30 to better visualize the behaviour of the MR in days prior to notification. The MR threshold of 2.9 is shown in red
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single day and was <2.9 the following day. On one occasion, the MR 
exceeded the threshold on two consecutive days in one house of 
a farm (D-4.1). This house also had the most occasions (five out of 
seven) in which the MR temporarily exceeded the threshold.
The MR exceeded the threshold in three out of six outbreaks 
prior to observation of clinical signs. In one outbreak, the increase 
of MR coincided with the first observation of clinical signs, and in 
two out of six outbreaks the clinical signs were observed prior to an 
increase in MR (Figure 1).
4  | DISCUSSION
The purpose of this case series was to describe the observed clini-
cal signs in HPAI H5N8 and H5N6 outbreaks on chicken and Pekin 
duck farms between 2014 and 2018 in the Netherlands and com-
pare this with the onset of an increased MR threshold (Gonzales & 
Elbers, 2018). We describe that in 12 out of 15 outbreaks for which 
a MR was available on chicken and Pekin duck farms, the MR in-
crease preceded or coincided with the first observation of clinical 
signs by the farmer. In one chicken and two Pekin duck outbreaks, 
clinical signs were observed prior to a MR increase. Additionally, 
in most cases the first clinical signs were seen within a day or two 
after the onset of an increased MR. Although these observations 
conveyed the idea that MR could be an earlier indicator of HPAI in-
fection, when MR is less affected, for instance for less virulent AI 
virus strains, the observation of clinical signs in combination with 
MR may provide additional indication for farmers and veterinarians 
and prompt them to notifying the disease.
It should be noted that we looked at the first day the MR ex-
ceeded the threshold and compared that with the first observation 
of clinical signs according to the interviews with the farmers, be-
cause we were interested in the timing of detection of clinical signs 
in relation to an increase of the MR. Gonzales and Elbers (2018), 
however, proposed that the MR should be implemented in practice 
to notify authorities only after the MR exceeds the threshold for 
two consecutive days, to reduce false-positive signals (i.e. increase 
specificity). By using that logic, an increased MR still preceded or 
coincided with the first observation of clinical signs in eight out of 
15 outbreaks (five outbreaks on chicken farms, three outbreaks on 
Pekin duck farms).
To our knowledge, this is the first report to apply this MR thresh-
old in Pekin duck outbreaks. Our results show that the MR fluctu-
ated more in Pekin duck farms in comparison with the layer farms 
and exceeded the threshold more often in the 30 day period prior 
to the HPAI virus infection. However, in six of the seven occasions 
that the MR exceeded the threshold in Pekin duck farms, the MR 
only exceeded the set threshold for 1 day, which would not lead to a 
notification to the authorities when the MR is applied as suggested 
by Gonzales and Elbers (2018). Furthermore, the MR exceeded the 
threshold in all outbreaks on Pekin duck and chicken farms, whereas 
the DM only exceeded 0.5% in four out of seven outbreaks on the 
Pekin duck farms and in six out of nine outbreaks on chicken farms. 
Moreover, in eight out of nine outbreaks in chicken and Pekin duck 
farms where the DM did exceed 0.5%, the MR had already exceeded 
its set thresholds 1–4 days prior. In pheasants, however, it was found 
that exceeding a set absolute threshold on two consecutive days 
resulted in the best trade-off between false-alarm rate and early 
detection compared with a 7 day moving average or exceeding a 
set absolute threshold for 1 day (Ssematimba et al., 2019). Due to 
the limited data set, we were not able to evaluate these trade-offs 
appropriately, but the results obtained from these H5Nx outbreaks 
in the Netherlands suggest that the MR could be a more sensitive 
parameter to monitor for HPAI virus infection in Pekin ducks com-
pared with the current DM used in Dutch legislation for notification 
to the authorities. As the choice of an effective mortality threshold 
requires evaluation of the trade-off between lowering the threshold 
to enhance early detection of infected flocks and the corresponding 
increase in false alarm rates in uninfected flocks, more research is 
needed. To assess and validate the currently used MR, and deter-
mine the best set threshold for an optimal sensitivity and specificity 
for Pekin ducks, and where possible also for other poultry species, 
flock data from outbreaks with preferably different HPAI virus 
strains should be analysed.
In chickens, veterinarians reported general clinical signs in all 
nine outbreaks, signs of the gastrointestinal tract in seven out-
breaks, mucosal membrane and skin in five and respiratory tract 
also in five outbreaks at the day of notification. The clinical sings 
were not notably different over the years, although the outbreaks 
in 2014 and 2016 were caused by subtype H5N8 and in 2017–2018 
by H5N6. These findings are in line with earlier reports about H5Nx 
infections in chickens (Pohlmann et al., 2017; Sun et al., 2016). Sun 
et al. (2016) found that naturally infected H5Nx chickens developed 
systemic disease, congestion and haemorrhage of the comb, wattles 
and feet, subcutaneous haemorrhages and oedema around the hock 
and shanks, which are similar to the clinical signs that were reported 
in the mucosal membrane and skin (Table S1). Early in the flock in-
fection process, however, the farmers in our study mainly observed 
clinical signs that could only be considered as general clinical signs, 
which are not specific for HPAI virus infection (Elbers et al., 2007; 
Swayne, Suarez, & Sims, 2013) suggesting that in early stages of the 
infection process it is difficult to distinguish HPAI virus infection 
from other diseases that lead to systemic disease. Clearly, when the 
farmer or veterinarian suspects HPAI infection, immediate notifica-
tion is needed. However, in cases with rather mild clinical signs or 
limited increased mortality not specific for HPAI, the submission of 
cloacal or pharyngeal swabs to exclude AI infection is recommended 
to facilitate detection of circulating AI virus at an early stage. This is 
already implemented in the Netherlands, as mentioned in Box 1, and 
has shown to be effective in detecting LPAI outbreaks, and inciden-
tally, as described in this study for duck farm D-1, also for detection 
of HPAI outbreaks at an early stage (Elbers, Gorgievski-Duijvesteijn, 
Zarafshani, & Koch, 2010).
In Pekin ducks, veterinarians reported general clinical signs and 
nervous or locomotor signs most often and in all outbreaks. This 
was followed by respiratory and gastrointestinal signs, which were 
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both reported in five out of seven outbreaks. The high incidence 
of nervous and locomotor signs, also observed by six of the Pekin 
duck farmers, is in contrast with the incidence in chickens, where 
nervous and locomotor signs were only reported in two outbreaks 
by veterinarians. Although the outbreaks in 2014 and 2016 were 
caused by different subtypes of H5Nx, the clinical signs were not 
notably different over the years in Pekin ducks. The observation 
of neurological signs (mainly head tremors, torticollis and ataxia) 
in our study in Pekin ducks is in line with findings reported in an 
outbreak of H5N8 among fattening Pekin ducks in Hungary in 
2015 (Bányai et al., 2016) where affected ducks showed neurologic 
signs, including torticollis. These findings are further supported 
with the results of studies where Pekin ducks were infected ex-
perimentally with different H5Nx subtypes of clade 2.3.4.4 (Sun 
et al., 2016). However, in other experimental inoculated domestic 
ducks with H5N8 viruses of the same clade (2.3.4.4), a wide range 
of pathobiological outcomes, from no clinical signs to some neu-
rological signs to severe disease, were reported (Kang et al., 2015; 
Pantin-Jackwood et al., 2017; Shivaprasad, Carnaccini, Crossley, 
Senties-Cue, & Chin, 2016). Although previous cases have shown 
that clinical manifestation and mortality in Anseriformes species 
highly depends on the phenotypic characteristics of the HPAI virus 
(EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (EFSA AHAW Panel), 
2017), the current case series emphasizes that Pekin duck farmers 
and veterinarians should be aware that observation of neurological 
signs in a flock could be an indication of HPAI virus infection and 
might require further diagnostic follow-up.
Compared to the veterinarians, farmers observed and reported 
less specific clinical signs, especially regarding respiratory and gas-
trointestinal signs in both chicken and ducks. This difference may be 
due to the specialized training and experience of the veterinarians in 
poultry veterinary medicine to observe signs of disease, and veteri-
narians may be better equipped with a repertoire of specific words to 
indicate their observations and relate that to a specific organ system. 
The discrepancy in observation of clinical signs between farmers and 
veterinarians is, however, smaller than we anticipated, suggesting that 
the farmers were aware of signs to look for. This shows that training 
and awareness of the farmer in detecting clinical signs is an important 
tool in detecting HPAI virus infection at an early stage.
The willingness of the farmer and practitioners to report a sus-
picion of a notifiable disease to the authorities may be different for 
the very first suspicion compared with suspicions after the first con-
firmed HPAI outbreak (Elbers et al., 2010). To prevent the spread of 
HPAI viruses to other farms, it is crucial to notify a suspicion as early 
as possible to be able to adequately diagnose and quickly depopu-
late the farms. The first outbreak of a HPAI (H5Nx; outbreak no. L-1) 
in 2014 had increased mortality (>2.9) for 5 days prior to notifica-
tion. In the outbreaks after 2014, the mortality ratios exceeded the 
threshold 0–3 days prior to notification, which suggest that farmers 
were more alert and reported a suspicion of notifiable disease more 
rapidly. Additionally, two Pekin duck farms and one chicken farm had 
multiple outbreaks of HPAI in 2014, 2016–2017 on their farms, mak-
ing the farmers even more aware of the risk of a new outbreak. Due 
to the fast reporting of HPAI suspicion of farmers and veterinarians 
to the authorities, the spread of HPAI viruses to other poultry facil-
ities was minimized.
To conclude, the current study gives an indication that the use of 
an objective MR with a set threshold could be a reliable parameter 
to detect HPAI virus infection on chicken and Pekin duck farms at 
an early stage and may perform even better when complemented 
with detection of clinical signs in poultry farms, provided farmers 
are well trained to notice them. These results underline the need 
to validate the MR in Pekin ducks and other poultry species, and it 
should encourage farmers, veterinarians and veterinary institutes in 
other countries to monitor and register mortality on farms more rig-
orously, because a poultry-specific MR could serve as an important 
indicator in HPAI poultry surveillance programs.
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